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INTRODUCTION
Given that employees pose a large threat to organizational cybersecurity, much
research attention has been directed to identifying individual risk factors for
cybersecurity noncompliance and misbehavior. However, no study to date has formally
examined how the risk of organizational cybersecurity incident changes over time, or
how organizational characteristics affect this risk. Examining changes in risk across
time has become a necessity due to the abundant evidence that cybersecurity incidents
are increasing in both frequency and severity. Previously-employed methods such as
odds ratios fail to account for the time-based component needed for properly analyzing
the continuously-changing threat of cyberattacks. Therefore, proposed study aims to
answer the question: what organizational factors are associated with cyber breaches?

Table 1: Preliminary Covariate Results.

HYPOTHESES
H1: Industry type will significantly influence the hazard ratio of cyberbreaches.
H2: Organizational revenue will be associated with an increased hazard ratio.
H3: Handling sensitive information will be associated with an increased hazard ratio.

PROPOSED METHODOLOGY
Sample:
Organizations listed in the top Fortune 1000 from 2005-2019 will be used as the
population at risk. Business records will be collected from publicly-available sources.
Event data regarding the occurrence of a cybersecurity incident will be collected from
the dataset maintained by Privacy Rights Clearinghouse for those years, which
currently contains information on over 9,000 security incidents.
ANALYSES
The proposed study aims to conduct a survival analysis (SA) of cybersecurity events
across the past decade, examining broad factors that impact the changing
probability of cyberincidents. In particular, the proposed study will examine
associations between cyberbreaches and industry type, annual revenue, and the
sensitivity of information handled in the organization. To analyze the impact of
organizational factors on the risk of cyberincident, the current study will record
security breaches (or lack thereof) using publically-available data recorded by Privacy
Rights Clearinghouse.
Sample Data Set:

PRELIMINARY RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Preliminary results of 31 events across the 500 companies included in initial analyses
indicate an overall increase in risk of cyberincident from 2004-2019. Industry type
significantly associated with increased risks of breach, with financial and healthcare
organizations suffering more incidents than energy or communication companies.
The sensitivity of information processed was not significantly related to the base risk
of breach, though higher organizational profit was positively related.
Discussion
Initial results support the first hypothesis regarding associations between industry type
and experience of cyberevent. The “industry” variable itself is nominal, so the change
in hazard ratio cannot be interpreted beyond the observation that financial and
healthcare institutions experienced a higher hazard ratio than did communications and
energy corporations. The second hypothesis—which proposed that higher-profit
organizations would be the recipient of more cyberattacks than lower-profit
organizations—was supported, such that organizational profit was positively
associated with an increased risk of cyberbreach. As the proposed study measures only
successful cyberattacks, it cannot determine whether these organizations are targeted
more in general, or simply invest less into cybersecurity efforts. However, the latter is
less likely to be the case, given the immense amount of spending funneled into
cybersecurity each year.
Preliminary results did not support Hypothesis 3—though insignificant, the direction
of the effect ran contrary to expectations. One potential explanation is the current
study’s operationalization of cybersecurity incidents as breaches reported as
successful. It may be that organizations dealing with sensitive information do
experience more cyberattacks, but that they successfully deter the vast majority of
them. Further investigations into the differences in successful vs non-successful attacks
are warranted.

CONTRIBUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

Figure 1: Preliminary Kaplan-Meier Curves for Survival from 2004-2019 with 95%
CI [Left], and for survival between organizations dealing with sensitive vs nonsensitive data [Right].

Contributions:
The initial results—albeit gleaned from a condensed dataset—highlight the insight to
be provided by the proposed study. Longitudinally identifying characteristics that
increase or decrease the risk of cyberincidents will emphasize to organizations the
particular importance of considering their vulnerability to security-related issues—
issues that are predicted to only grow in importance for organizations, their customers,
and their employees.
Limitations:
Currently, limited results are available. Full conclusions cannot be drawn regarding the
hypothesized effects until the complete set of data is collected and analyzed.
Additionally, the difficult nature of establishing a population at risk that is both
comprehensive and manageable has resulted in a slightly biased sample. There is
limited evidence to suggest that top-performing companies are more targeted by
cyberattackers than poorer-performing companies, and relying on the freely-available
Fortune list inevitably leads to an overinclusion of top companies. Results drawn from
these analyses must emphasize the context of the organizations included. However, the
issue of cybersecurity remains relevant to high-performing companies.
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